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Corporate Adolescence: Why Did
“We” Not Work?
Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale*
In academic and public commentary, entrepreneurial finance is usually
portrayed as a quintessential American success story, an institutional structure
whereby expert venture capitalists with strong reputational incentives channel
much-needed equity to deserving entrepreneurs, then subject them to intense
monitoring to assure they stay on the path to hoped-for success in the form of
an initial public offering or public company acquisition.1 Thus, it is jarring that
in recent years there have been so many troubles, from gross embarrassments
to allegations of outright criminality, at companies like Uber, Theranos, and
our subject here, WeWork. These dramas are often portrayed in terms of the
predictable sins of youthfulness: reckless, disruptive, risk-taking behaviors that
come from the volatile interaction of a charismatic young leader and a cult(ure)
of STEM-smart followers who buy into the dream.2

The authors thank Olivia Brown, Samantha Glazer, Hollie Chenault, Claire Creighton, Jing
Xu, and Michael Marcus for their research, insights, and good humor.
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E.g., Bernard Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets,
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Among many, see generally ANTONIO GARCIA MARTINEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE
PROFITS AND RANDOM FAILURES IN SILICON VALLEY (2016); JOHN CARRYREOU, BAD BLOOD:
SECRETS AND LIES IN SILICON VALLEY (2018)(about the Theranos scandal); MIKE ISSAC,
PUMPED: THE BATTLE FOR UBER (2019); REEVES WIEDEMAN, BILLION DOLLAR LOSER
(2020)(WeWork); Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company Lies, Geo. L.J. (forthcoming, 2021);
Steve Blank, When Founders Go Too Far, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 2017; Erin Griffith, The
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Rev. Insights 65 (2020); Noam Schreiber, The Shekreli Syndrome: Youthful Trouble, Tech Success,
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Winkler, Tech Founders Now Need to Grow Up Fast, Wall St. J., April 18-19, 2020, at B1.
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We have no quarrel here with the historical record of success. But the
market for start-up capital constantly changes.3 We are not the first legal
academics to express concern about whether the conventional model is
descriptively or normatively suited to today’s world, particularly as the period
of time from the first capital raise to exit becomes much longer and sources of
private capital grow much larger.4 This allows some privileged firms (especially
the so-called “unicorns”5) to deepen their footprint on society and the economy
substantially before taking on the disclosure-oriented obligations of public
corporation status. Or maybe never take them on at all. Indeed, while the
public and private worlds stay distinct as a matter of law,6 the forces of
publicness are intruding on the private domain7 and raising the risks to
recklessness and avoidance.
Our title’s metaphorical reference to corporate adolescence is meant to
underscore the ever-lengthening period of time, and the resulting temptations
without sufficient grown-up supervision, that high-tech start-up companies
have before undergoing the so-called rites of passage to public adulthood.8 We
argue that this runs the risk of (by failing to lean against) a build-up of bad
See Josh Lerner & Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation: What We
Know and How Much We Still Need to Learn, 34 J. Econ. Persp. 237, 253
(2020)(“Understanding why traditional venture capital contractual provisions have faded in
importance and their social welfare implications appears to be a promising area of future
research for both theorists and empiricists alike,” pointing to some of the high-profile
scandals noted earlier).
4
See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155 (2019); Jennifer S. Fan,
Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 583 (2016); Usha
Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevance of Section 12(g), 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1561;
Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole in the JOBS Act, How and Why to Rewrite the Rules that
Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 Ind. L. Rev. 151 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort
& Robert B. Thompson, Publicness in Contemporary Securities Regulation after the JOBS Act, 101
Geo. L.J. 337 (2012).
5
See Keith Brown & Kenneth Wiles, The Growing Blessing of Unicorns, 32 J. App. Corp. Fin.
52 (2020).
6
See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries
in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1573 (2013).
7
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and "Privateness" on
Corporate Cultures, 43 Seattle U. L. Rev. 377 (2020). On publicness generally, see Hillary
A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1629 (2014).
8
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to refer to firms well along the pre-public growth curve, not the behavioral context. E.g.,
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choices and testy behaviors commonly observed in human adolescents, e.g.,
risk-taking and rule-breaking, thereby embedding in the firm’s habits and
culture problems that may later be hard to fix. This is especially true when the
founders themselves are young and prone to immature behavior, though we do
not so limit our attention. There is rhetorical expression of the problem in
familiar memes like “fake it ‘til you make it” and “move fast and break things.”
To explore all this, we borrow an approach from business school case
studies.9 We tell the WeWork story in some detail, not simply because it is
interesting (which it is) but because it starkly poses a question that many—
investors, board members, lawyers, and regulators, among others—will find
difficult to answer. How could this happen as against all the high-powered
incentives and smart-money discipline that supposedly exists in venture
finance?10 And what if anything could or should have been done differently,
particularly by way of corporate governance? By itself, WeWork is just an
anecdote, and to an extent an aberration. But toggling back and forth between
narrative and analysis, our article makes the case that start-up adolescence is
both an apt metaphor and real cause for concern.
We do not try to resolve all this normatively, content mainly with
showing the interplay of conflicts in start-up financing that lead to the
prediction that the situation is a persistently risky one, where the risks and costs
fall on less sophisticated investors, retail and institutional, and with unfortunate
spillovers to the capital markets generally. Insistence on private ordering has a
dark side. So we point with some frustration to the recent pushes by Congress
and the SEC to increase the number of retail investors eligible to invest in this
space, in the name of “opportunity” that is more likely to turn into
opportunism.

I.

THE WEWORK STORY, PART 1

For a case study involving legal ethics in the context of the Theranos scandal, see Gautam
Hans, How and Why Did It Go So Wrong?: Theranos as a Legal Ethics Case Study (May 29,
2020). Georgia State University Law Review, Forthcoming 2021, available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3613443.
10
See Pollman, supra note 4 (“If VCs are strong monitors, why are examples of oversight
failures so plentiful and varied?”).
9
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A dreamer who envisions co-working office space on Mars, and a man
raised by a women’s collective in Oregon.11 They were the builders of
WeWork – literally. Adam Neumann was a schemer, who persuaded longtime real estate moguls and Silicon Valley funders, who “didn’t do real estate,”
to support the company. Miguel McKelvey was part architect, part schemer,
and a hands-on builder. In 2019, McKelvey was the Chief Culture Officer and
Neumann was the Chief Executive Officer of a Series H Unicorn with a
valuation of $47 Billion.12 In 2020, Neumann was out as CEO, and the private
valuation was down to $7.3 billion. 13 By March of 2020, the valuation was at
$2.9 billion and by June, McKelvey had stepped down as well.14
WeWork began when Adam Neumann rented out part of the office
space he was using in a Brooklyn office where he was selling high-end baby
clothes. In an effort to cut costs, he rented out a corner of his office to someone
he found on craigslist. Shortly thereafter, Neumann looked at another building
with his landlord, Joshua Guttman. Neumann proposed a co-working idea,
with a shared profit. Guttman bit, and Neumann then approached McKelvey
about the idea. Green Desk was the outcome – and the predecessor to
WeWork, though it was decidedly different from what WeWork would
become.15
Despite fears about the economy, the company opened in 2008, and the
idea took off.16 Later, Neumann and McKelvey sold their share of the business
to Guttman for $3 million dollars to be paid over several years. In 2011, they
used cash from the sale, credit cards, and loans from friends, to relocate the
concept to SoHo, and opened the first office of what was to become the
WeWork model. Neumann then sent “free” plane tickets to friends in Israel
Alex Konrad, Inside The Phenomenal Rise Of WeWork, Forbes (Nov. 5, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2014/11/05/the-rise-ofwework/#6a557b606f8b.
12
Sophia Kunthara, From Hot to Not: A Timeine of WeWork’s IPO Implosion, Crunchbase (Oct. 1,
2019 https://news.crunchbase.com/news/from-hot-to-not-a-timeline-of-weworks-ipoimplosion/. Indeed, just one year earlier, the company had the third largest startup
valuation, after Uber and Airbnb.
13
Lauren Feiner, SoftBank values WeWork at $2.9 billion, down from $47 billion a year ago,
CNBC (May 18, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/18/softbank-ceo-callswework-investment-foolish-valuation-falls-to-2point9-billion.html.
14
Deirdre Bosa, WeWork co-founder Miguel McKelvey is leaving at the end of the month, CNBC (June 5,
2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/wework-co-founder-miguel-mckelvey-is-leavingat-the-end-of-the-month.html.
15
Konrad, supra note 11.
16
Konrad, supra note 11.
11
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who thought they were coming to the States for fun, and who ended up working
seven days a week, doing the construction build out.17
By 2012, WeWork had multiple locations and big aspirations.
Neumann spoke publicly about expanding technology, but when asked how or
why, he did not have an answer. This is notable, because such statements, in a
publicly traded company, can be the root of class action claims for liability.18
Nevertheless, the company continued to grow and to raise private money. In
January 2012, WeWork raised $6.85 million from friends and family; $17
million in a Series A in July, 2012; $40 million in a Series B in May, 2013; and
$150 million in a Series C in February, 2014.19 These numbers were about
double the size of the average Series rounds in the same timeframe.20
The Series C round was particularly notable because the company
attracted the attention of Benchmark, one of Silicon Valley’s most well-known
venture capital funds.21 Because Benchmark had not done real estate before, its
leader flew to New York to vet the concept and see firsthand why WeWork
was different from other shared office space concepts. Sold on Neumann’s
vision, Benchmark valued the company at $100 million and then, when the
investment bank Jefferies joined, the valuation increased to $450 million.
Shortly thereafter, McKelvey pitched Jared Kushner and won a prize spot as an
anchor tenant in a Dumbo project.22
In the same timeframe, the adolescent side of WeWork was increasingly
becoming public – and receiving press coverage. For example, in 2012, the
Konrad, supra note 11.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
19
Dylan Tweney, WeWork raises $355M at nearly $5B valuation, plans IPO, VentureBeat (Dec.
15, 2014), https://venturebeat.com/2014/12/15/wework-raises-355m-at-nearly-5bvaluation-plans-ipo/.
20
Average seed capital in 2012 was $1.7 million; average series A in 2012 was 9.2 million;
average series B in 2013 was 17.2 million. https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/25/a-quicklook-at-how-fast-series-a-and-seed-rounds-have-ballooned-in-recent-years-fueled-by-topinvestors/. The average series C in 2014 was $26 million. https://tech.co/news/muchfunding-raise-round-2015-05).
21
Konrad, supra note 11.
22
Konrad, supra note 11. Neumann, a former Israeli soldier, reportedly assisted longtime
friend Kushner in the development of a video promoting peace in the Middle East. According
to Vanity Fair, Neumann asked WeWork development director Roni Bahar to find an
advertising firm to create "a slick video for Kushner that would showcase what an
economically transformed West Bank and Gaza would look like." Gabriel Sherman, You
Don’t Bring Bad News to the Cult Leader: Inside the Fall of WeWork, Vanity Fair (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/11/inside-the-fall-of-wework.
17
18

5

company started taking entrepreneurs and employees to camp, and in 2014,
the New York Times went along.23 The family of Adam Neumann’s wife, Rebekah
Paltrow Neumann, owns a summer camp in the Adirondacks, and the company
used it for several years. The culture at camp, which echoed that of the
company was, well, adolescent. The goal was networking and “a change of
pace.”24 There was neither reliable cellphone service nor Wi-Fi. Instead,
hookahs, vintage typewriters, and canoes loaded with beer were aplenty.”25
Marijuana was not provided but was in “abundance.”
In 2014, at the time when Benchmark was considering investing
additional funds, one 31-year old entrepreneur at camp was wearing tattoos on
his face and body and holding Super Soaker Water Guns filled with vodka. He
stated that he was “getting into as much trouble as humanly possible.” Another
man also carrying a Super Soaker, “declared to the crowd, ‘If you don’t want
to see me naked, don’t go to camp.’ Another had turned his free camp T-shirt
into a crop top and said, ‘We’re gonna bro out so hard.’” Then, he noted that
the camp had a “different vibe than… the city or even the Hamptons, …
[where] you still have a certain level of internal restraint.”26
Restraint and WeWork, however, did not go hand-in-hand. Neumann
roamed the office in bare feet. The company offered unlimited free beers to
employees and tenants at all hours of the day. Neumann also loved Don Julio
tequila and would persuade employees to take shots of it at 2 a.m. meetings.27
Marijuana at work was common, as was dancing around fires in the woods on
the weekends.28 Neumann even “installed an infrared sauna and a cold plunge
pool in his Manhattan office.” 29
Despite the adolescent antics, the funding continued. Indeed, a few
months after the 2014 New York Times camp article appeared, in December

Marisa Meltzer, WeWork Goes to Summer Camp, The New York Times, (Sept. 5, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/fashion/wework-goes-to-summer-camp.html.
24
Meltzer, supra note 23.
25
Meltzer, supra note 23.
26
Meltzer, supra note 23.
27
Amy Chozick, Adam Neumann and the Art of Failing Up, The New York Times (May 18,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/business/adam-neumann-wework-exitpackage.html.
28
Chozick, supra note 27.
29
Chozick, supra note 27.
23
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2014, WeWork raised $355 million in a Series D offering.30 It was still not
profitable but was valued at $5 billion. The investors included big names:
Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, and the press reported that an initial public
offering (IPO) was likely in the next few years.31
Although Neumann compared the company to Uber and Airbnb, both
of which were in the “sharing” economy, WeWork’s model was riskier, because
WeWork actually owned or leased the office space that people shared.32 The
liability, so to speak, belonged to WeWork. Even before the COVID-19
pandemic, the success of the business model depended on WeWork’s
continued ability to service long-term leases on real estate by renting out office
space at a higher price on a short-term lease. The model also relied upon
continued demand for cramped office space where people work elbow-toelbow. At the time of the Series D, of course, money for entrepreneurs was
flowing and making it possible for them to afford the rent, but the key question
was what would happen to the business model when the bubble burst and
WeWork still had all that property.33
As we will see, the bubble did burst – when publicness intervened. But
not before WeWork did a Series E ($444 M), F ($690 M), G ($4.4 B), and H
($1 B).34 All of these fundraising rounds were delineated as “late stage,” and all
are significant in size. None raised eyebrows. Instead, initially skeptical
investors (JP Morgan) lined up for opportunities, and Masayoshi Son of
Softbank jumped on board with the Series G and had a wild and expensive
ride.35

Lindsay Gellman and Eliot Brown, WeWork: Now a $5 Billion Co-Working Startup, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wework-now-a-5-billion-real-estatesartup-1418690163.
31
Tweney, supra note 19.
32
Issie Lapowsky, Believe It: Co-Working Space Startup WeWork Is Now Worth $5B, Wired (Dec.
16, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/12/wework-valuation/.
33
Lapowsky, supra note 31.
34
Sophia Kunthara, WeWork May Reduce Its Valuation Ahead of IPO By Tens of Billons, Crunchbase
(Sept. 5, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/wework-may-reduce-its-valuationahead-of-ipo-by-tens-of-billions/.
35
Katrina Brooker, WeFail: How the Doomed Masa Son-Adam Neumann relationship set WeWork
on
the
road
to
Disaster,
Fast
Company
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90426446/wefail-how-the-doomed-masa-son-adamneumann-relationship-set-wework-on-the-road-to-disaster.
30
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The story of Mr. Son’s investment is apparently “famous.”36 Neumann
spent only 12 minutes with Son touring the WeWork headquarters before
reaching agreement on a $4.4 billion investment – an investment for which
Mr. Son’s son has expressed regret.37 Then, Neumann hopped into his white
Mercedes Maybach and, while his chauffeur drove, listened to rap and enjoyed
the win.38 Many say that this investment and the opinion of Son, that Neumann
should take on even more wild ideas, is part of what led to the WeWork
downfall.39 But, as Part III will reveal, the board, the bankers, and others all
played a role.
After the Softbank investment, Neumann’s grandiosity accelerated. He
wanted to be the world’s first trillionaire. He wanted to be president of the
world.40 He started WeLive, a concept for short term apartment rentals – but
framed them as places that would “drive down suicide rates because ‘no one
ever feels alone.’”41 He described the WeGrow school and a plan to “shelter
the world’s orphans” and “give them a family, the WeWork family.”42 “There
was talk of a WeBank, WeSail, WeSleep, an airline.”43 And still the money
came in and talk of an IPO grew.
The IPO, however, was the financial undoing of WeWork. The antics
and choices, the burn rate, the conflicts of interest, and the lack of hope for
profitability all became public – though not until after the bankers had floated
a huge valuation with an “incoherent prospectus” and were forced to pull it
back.44 The business model, long-term leases on real estate that was renovated
and rented with short term leases, i.e., no long run predictability of revenues,
was always flawed. Initial valuations for the IPO were in the $40-50 billion
range and even when dropped to $10 billion, the company discovered it had no
buyers.45 This was the point at which publicness met WeWork and its
governance choices head on.
Chozick, supra note 27.
Feiner, supra note 13.
38
Chozick, supra note 27.
39
Brooker, supra note 35.
40
Chozick, supra note 27.
41
Chozick, supra note 27.
42
Chozick, supra note 27.
43
Chozick, supra note 27.
44
Chozick, supra note 27.
45
Joshua Franklin and Anirban Sen, WeWork delays IPO after frosty investor response, Reuters
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wework-ipo/wework-delays-ipoafter-frosty-investor-response-idUSKBN1W12T6.
36
37
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Although the wheels came off the WeWork bus at the time of the IPO,
the seeds of its crash were planted much earlier. The culture inevitably
produced allegations like those at Uber, of discrimination and a “frat-boy
culture.”46 Neumann’s Chief of Staff claimed she was demoted and fired for
being pregnant and raising concerns about Neumann turning the company jet
into a “hotbox,” filled with marijuana smoke.47 Another lawsuit included claims
of sexual assault at a work event and groping at the summer camp.48 According
to the complaint, both incidents were reported to HR and neither resulted in
discipline to the men involved.49 The company later stated, without admitting
anything, that such behavior would not be tolerated, but the problem was that
the “culture” of WeWork was the product of the corporate adolescence and
cult of personality our “regulatory” regime has promoted.
WeWork grew because it was the beneficiary of the “private” offering
regime and a tech/Unicorn bubble in which the market encouraged companies
with huge burn rates and behavior that, in the public space, would not have
been acceptable. When the venture capital investors, who had put more than
$12 billion into WeWork, wanted to cash out and Masa Son’s cash infusions
stopped, “Neumann was blindsided.” It appears that although he may not have
understood the potential for the party to stop, he did understand the value of
the privilege with which he was operating. But, without cash to support the
burn, Neumann who “never wanted to go public … and wanted to remain
private so he could do whatever the f--- he wanted,” yielded to the pressure to
go public – or at least try to do so.50
Unfortunately for Neumann, the market’s interest in and tolerance for
companies based on ideas that might generate cash but not profits had waned.
Uber’s offering was a huge disappointment to investors.51 Another company
with a culture of corporate adolescence, Uber had faced a series of scandals
Gaby Del Valle, WeWork's “frat-boy” culture enables sexual harassment, new suit claims, Vox
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/12/17969190/weworklawsuit-sexual-assault-harassment-retaliation.
47
David Yaffe-Bellany, WeWork’s Ousted C.E.O. Adam Neumann is Accused of Pregnancy
Discrimination,
The
New
York
Times
(Oct.
31,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/business/wework-neumann-discriminationcomplaint.html.
48
Del Valle, supra note 46.
49
Complaint, Bardhi v. WeWork, EEOC (Oct. 31, 2019), http://www.wigdorlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Bardhi-v.-WeWork-Filed.pdf
50
Sherman, supra note 22.
51
Maureen Farrell, 2019 the Year of IPO Disappointment, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/2019-the-year-of-ipo-disappointment-11577615400.
46
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that, because its founder, Travis Kalanick retained control, had been
consistently ignored – that is, until the company’s board finally bowed to
publicness and pressure. A venture capital director who had made sexist
comments resigned, Kalanick was pushed out (and paid off), and a new CEO,
with a strong positive and public company reputation, Dara Khosrowshahi, was
installed.52
Khosrowshahi’s job was to clean up Uber’s and manage the company
through an IPO.53 He did so, but with mixed results. He began with apologies
and statements about the commitment to a changed culture, one that would not
tolerate sexual harassment and law breaking in the core of the business.54 He
used words like “trust” and stressed the choices the company was now making
to, arguably, grow up and understand its publicness and social license.
Although the scandals played a significant role in the pressure a cultural shift,
both Uber and WeWork craved cash. Cash is king in a company with a high
burn rate, and as the private money dries up, IPO pressure increases.
Eventually, Khosrowshahi did take Uber public, but the private “value” of the
company never materialized. The offering price, $45.00 per share, was well
below the company’s private valuations, and before the pandemic hit, Uber’s
stock was trading only at $41.00 per share.55
Whether the same will be true for WeWork remains to be seen.56 Its
attempted IPO failed in a very public fashion, resulting in considerable media
coverage about the adolescent antics of its founders, its conflicted structure,
and the lack of corporate governance controls, to which we return in Part III.

II.

THE POTENTIAL PATHOLOGIES OF START-UP CAPITAL RAISING

Evan Mills, A Short history of the Many, Many Ways Uber Screwed Up, Wired (June 21,
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/timeline-uber-crises/. Mike Isaac, With Uber’s
I.P.O., Dara Khosrowshahi is Taking Travis Kalanick’s Company Public, The New York Times
(May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/technology/uber-ipo-ceo-darakhosrowshahi-travis-kalanick.html.
53
Isaac, supra note 52.
54
Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 47.
55
Mike Isaac, Michael J. de la Merced, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, How the Promise of a $120
Billion Uber I.P.O Evaporated, The New York Times (May 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/technology/uber-ipo-price.html.
56
WeWork remains an operating company with considerable presence in the shared office
space marketplace, but without the mythology that drove its ambitions. What we describe
here is a financial implosion, not (yet) its failure as a going concern.
52
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The WeWork story shows what can happen within the domain of
corporate adolescence, but not whether it is commonplace enough to worry
deeply about. Surely most start-ups are not so immature. And even if it the
risk of such behavior is worrisome, the conventional venture finance narrative
predicts that it should be self-correcting: bad experiences like these will teach
funders a lesson that they would be foolish not to learn from, and their
reputational interests will incentivize them to take interest. We pause here to
address these two arguments.
When VCs finance a high-potential start-up, they only fund enough to
get the company moving toward success,57 at which point the start-up must
obtain a second round of financing, mostly from new sources of money, and
then a third, and so-on. (Seven or eight rounds would not be unusual today.)
There is a high-powered incentive to make it up each step of the ladder, with
regular scrutiny of the value of the firm at this still early stage. The founders
feel this sharply; so do the funders who have sunk so much money at an earlier
round. With growing evidence of success, the founders and early funders can
hold onto more of the enterprise; with troubles, that may be hard. Those
investors who have tied their fortunes to the founder do not want to mess with
what appears (in myth or reality) to be the firm’s best shot.

A. Behavioral Agency Costs
1. Edgy Behavior
Our quick overview of high-tech start up financing gives ample reason
to explain why founders will often find themselves shading the truth to stand
out. The initial pitch requires aggressive claims of an ability to achieve
promised results; after that, their feet are to the fire through the search for new
rounds of investment. The risk of failure is palpable—most start-ups do not
survive the gauntlet.

On how they do this, see Paul Gompers et al., How Do Venture Capitalists Make Decisions?,
135 J. Fin. Econ. 169 (2020).
57
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The temptation to dissemble in such high-stakes, high-expectations
environments would be natural for most people and most organizations.58
“Motivated inference” is the general phenomenon by which people exploit the
moral wiggle-room of ambiguity about both reality and expectations—reality
in terms of the enterprise being pitched, expectations about what to say or do
(or not say or do). Early stage ventures reek of uncertainty, which can support
inflated optimism that may be in good faith, but not necessarily warranted.59
Gradually, and down a very slippery slope of self-deception along with the
deception of others, representations about the venture’s progress take on a life
of their own.60 If there are conscious doubts about the project in its early stages,
ambiguity about disclosure norms can provide comfort. Many people feel
justified in leaving out troubling details from a statement otherwise technically
true, even though half-truths are fraudulent as a matter of law.61 This is where
the perception (if not reality) of prevailing norms can be summoned to duty for
good cause, project success. Some version of “everyone does it” enables those
with brilliant hopes and dreams to fake it with the expectation that all will be
forgiven or forgotten when they make it.
Certain situational pressures abundant in start-ups increase the
likelihood of dishonesty.62 Loss aversion is the tendency to take greater risks to
avoid losing what they possess relative to what they would take when seeking
to gain precisely the same thing; once started and financed, threats are filtered
through a loss frame. Cognitive stress and physical tiredness make
misrepresentation more likely. What starts out as innocent becomes a trap as
the adverse consequences of telling the truth grow.
See Yuri Mishina et al, Why Good Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High
Expectations and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality, 53 Acad. Mgt. J. 701 (2010).
59
This can take the form of conscious rationalization by entrepreneurs (see Elizabeth
Pollman, Private Company Lies) or a more pernicious form of self-deception whereby the
entrepreneur is firmly convinced of the rightness, and righteousness, of what he or she says
or thinks. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS,
WALL STREET AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 26-28, 38-42 (2016).
60
For an in-depth explanation,, see Vasilis Theoharakis et al., Going Down the Slippery Slope
of Legitimacy Lies in Early Stage Ventures: The Role of Moral Disengagement, J. Bus. Ethics (2020).
61
See Todd Rogers et al., Artful Paltering: The Risks and Rewards of Using Truthful Statements to
Mislead Others, 112 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 456 (2017); see also Christina Bicchieri et al., It’s
Not a Lie If Your Believe the Norm Does Not Apply: Conditional Norm Following with Strategic Beliefs,
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ppc/wpaper/0012.html (2019).
62
See Theoharakis et al., supra; for further discussion of ethics in the start-up arena, see
Jared Harris, Ethics and Entrepreneurship, 24 J. Bus. Vent. 407 (2009); Robert Cressey et al.,
Entrepreneurship, Governance and Ethics, 95 J. Bus. Ethics 117 (2010).
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That much applies to just about anybody in those circumstances.63 But
those who choose to become entrepreneurs have dispositions that can make
them more susceptible than most. A body of specialized research exists about
entrepreneurial psychology, suggesting that start-up founders have greaterthan-normal tendencies toward self-efficacy, self-assurance, autonomy, power
and independence.64 They are often highly intense and creative “think outside
the box” people. And even though each of these traits is an attractive one in
terms of who we think of as likely to succeed, each is also associated with a
higher risk of the kind of ethical risk-taking referred to earlier. Danny Miller,
a noted organizational psychologist who focuses on entrepreneurs, refers to this
as the “Janus face” problem.65 The adulation of the good face obscures the
heightened risk of the bad. In other words, the hyper-creative looks outside
the lines for opportunities and so discovers value; he (or less likely, but not
impossibly, she) also ignores lines that are not supposed to be crossed.66
Somewhat provocatively, one econometric study of entrepreneurs suggests a
combination of high cognitive ability and a history of illicit adolescent behavior
correlates with later success in this rough and tumble world.67
2. Youth
If entrepreneurs are generally more disposed toward risky behaviors,
then the young entrepreneurs who have such a claim on the public’s fascination
presumably inhabit an even higher behavioral risk category. To be clear, we
are not claiming that young founders dominate the start-up world. One study
shows that the average age of a successful founder is in the early to mid-40s,
often after one or more unsuccessful tries.68 But the authors of that study
acknowledge that young founders are a significant presence in the start-up

See Scott Rick & George Loewenstein, Hypermotvation, 45 J. Consumer Res. 645 (2008).
Many of these can be bundled into what is the most widely recognized bias of successful
business people, overconfidence. See David Hirshleifer, Are Overconfident CEOs Better
Innovators, 67 J. Fin. 1457 (2012); LANGEVOORT, supra, at 27.
65
Danny Miller, A Downside to the Entreprenurial Personality?, 39 Entrepreneurship: Theory
and Practice 1, 2 (Jan. 2015)
66
See Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of Creativity, 102 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych.
445 (2011).
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See Ross Levine & Yona Rubenstein, Smart and Illicit: Who Becomes an Entrepreneur and Do
They Earn More?, 132 Q.J. Econ. 963 (2017)( “[e]ven as teenagers, those who incorporate
later in life tend to score higher on learning aptitude tests, exhibit greater self-esteem, and
engage in more illicit activities than other people”).
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world and may be even preferred by many venture capitalists. They generate
a powerful mythology.
Entrepreneurs in their 20s and early 30s are, presumably, more likely
than their elders to exhibit the kinds of adolescent and post-adolescent
behaviors common generally—more impulsive, norms-challenging, and
aggressive, only gradually becoming more mature. Those given millions of
dollars in early-round funding have their self-esteem validated before ever
having struggled to success, and are prone to compensate for the reality that
they may be in over their head with grandiose expressions of self-efficacy.
Putting aside for a moment their VC handlers on the board of directors, they
are likely to be surrounded by similarly young cohorts, with a resulting echo
chamber in terms of exuberance and confidence. If given a long (or no) leash,
they may be especially creative, intense and motivated, but undisciplined. Not
having much in the way of experience to draw from in knowing which lines are
meant to be challenged or not, they may convince each other that all lines are
suspect or to be ignored.
Because of the closed-in, secretive nature of early stage ventures, this is
a hard proposition to test empirically. With respect to public companies, CEO
age is associated with a higher risk appetite among males69 and greater
competitiveness.70 CEO behavior (on the job and private), in turn, has a viral
effect on the rest of the team of employees, signaling that ethical aggression is
indeed the way to get ahead.71 In other words, the youthful organization as a
whole is arguably more susceptible to inflated entitlement precisely because of
its collective naiveté.
3. Gender
By all accounts, the world of high-tech start-up capital-raising has a
diversity problem, including massive gender inequality. Stories of hostile work
environments abound. Despite evidence that female start ups are more
Matthew Serfling, CEO Age and the Riskiness of Corporate Policies, 25 J. Corp. Fin. 251 (2014);
Jarrko Peltomaki et al., Age, Gender and Risk-taking: Evidence from S&P 500 Executives,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2547516.
70
See Yim, The Acquisitiveness of Youth, CEO Age, and Acquisition Behavior, 108 J. Fin. Econ.
250 (2013); Maurice Levi et al., Deal or No Deal: Hormones and the M&A Game, 56 Mgt. Sci.
1452 (2010)(using CEO age as proxy for male hormone-driven behavior).
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See Lee Biggerstaff et al., Suspect CEOs, Unethical Culture, and Corporate Misbehavior, 117 J.
Fin. Econ. 98 (2015). On off-the-job behavior, see Why Boards Should Worry About Executives
Off-the-Job Behavior, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 2020, at 17; Tom Lin, Executive Private
Misconduct, 88 G.W. L. Rev. 327 (2020).
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successful than those of their male counterparts,72 in 2017, for example,
venture capitalists put thirty-five times the money into male-founded start-ups
than female founded; the number of male founded start-ups financed was
sixteen times the number of female founded firms.73 The venture capital
industry itself is heavily male dominated. The reasons are many, no doubt, for
this situation. While there is some evidence showing willingness to hear diverse
pitches,74 VCs may well be using stereotypical heuristics for deciding what
constitutes promise—mental images of the aggressiveness and single-minded
intensity it takes to succeed that generate a natural gender bias in funding
choices.75 The gross gender imbalance in an industry where connections and
networks matter is bound to be self-perpetuating, and change slowly. And the
supply of talented women is truncated by stereotypes and bias all along the
career progression, so that the pool of women entrepreneurs is smaller than it
should be.
Whatever the precise cluster of reasons for the bias, male domination is
likely to amplify the risky and aggressive traits and behaviors predicted above.
By some combination of hormones and role socialization, men are more likely
to cheat than women, a tendency that grows larger in group settings. From
this, one might presume that early stage start-ups too often offer, among many
other things, an intense male bonding experience that trumps truth-telling.
B. Downstream Agency Costs
In the conventional account of start-up finance, VC and other funders
bargain for sufficient control rights to enable close monitoring for risky
behaviors by founders and their teams. There is ample evidence of founders
See Katie Abouzahr, Matt Krentz, John Harthorne, and Frances Brooks Taplett, "Why
Women-Owned Startups Are a Better Bet," Boston Consulting Group (June 6,
2018), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/why-women-owned-startups-arebetter-bet (finding that startups founded and co-founded by women generated 78 cents for
every dollar while those founded by men produced only 31 cents per dollar).
73
See Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Gender, Race and Entrepreneurship, April 2020,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301982. One argument in favor
of a liberalized crowdfunding exemption was that the “crowd” would be more open to
diversity in founders of start-ups. There is some evidence to support that hope as to women
founders. See Schwartz, supra.
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being deposed as CEOs by funder-dominated boards.76 So in theory, the
tendencies described above should be kept in check.
But that depends on funder bargaining power at each stage of financing,
and by many accounts, the last decade (at least) has been marked by a shift in
power to the founder. There are more non-traditional sources of capital to
compete with the well-known VC firms, placing considerable limitations on
what they can demand from founders with good ideas.77 Neither VCs nor
private equity funders want a reputation for being overbearing, which might
hurt when competing for the next hot deal.78 New money sloshes around over
the course of all the financing rounds, a reason start-ups can stay private longer
to capture as much of the upside potential as possible for founders and early
funders before exit.
This leads to mixed incentives, especially (as with SoftBank and
WeWork) later investors are willing not only to buy new rounds of equity from
the issuer but also let earlier funders cash out in the same transaction.
Monitoring via internal controls can be costly, which is of concern because
start-ups tend to be cash poor and motivated to spend precious capital on that
which demonstrates tangible progress. Better governance devices might seem
a luxury early on, especially to entrepreneurs new to the business world, and
quickly become a form of deferred maintenance.
There are also mixed incentives that come from the frequent revaluations that come with each new round of financing. Start-ups are naturally
hard to value because they are so speculative, which is problematic in and of
That said, one reason given for VC preference for youthful founders is that they might not
drive as hard a bargain out of inexperience. See Azoulay et al., supra.
77
Many investors that once participated in venture capital via investments in venture capital
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itself since relative power and control rights shift at each funding round. That
creates an incentive to the creation of good news and the suppression of bad,
which need not necessarily suggest fraud but, as discussed earlier, biased
perceptions. Whether VCs or other early stage funders have an incentive to
expose risks and shortfalls via heavy monitoring is questionable, suggesting
some slack. Knowing too much can be dangerous. Sophisticated later stage
funders will understand this, but may nonetheless be limited by competitive
pressures from the increasingly diverse funding sources, especially at the later
stages. With larger and larger sums of money in the hands of competing later
round funders like private equity firms, hedge funds and even mutual funds,
bidding wars can ensue to reveal who has the most optimistic (not realistic)
valuation—the so-called winner’s curse. There is no good way of betting
against the company on the short-side, as there is in more well-developed
financial markets.79 Bubbles cam result that no one has a strong incentive to
pop by looking too closely for misbehavior in the face of apparent progress.
We leave to others further exploration of the directly conflicting
interests among founders and multi-round funders that this valuation
uncertainty produces, and the wide array of contractual responses.80 The less
well-appreciated conflicts story, among legal academics at least, faces in a
different direction: the conflicts (and incentive to inflate values) arising from
the relationship between funders and their own upstream suppliers of capital.
Nearly all the funders, from VC to later round funders, are themselves
managing other peoples’ money.81 The VC, for example, will have a set of
limited partners—institutions like pension funds, university endowments,
etc.—who contribute most of the capital to be invested it a range of start-ups,
hoping for a few big scores. The fund manager is compensated with sizable
See Jesse Fried & Jeffrey Gordon, The Valuation and Governance Bubbles of Silicon Valley,
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/10/the-valuation-and-governancebubbles-of-silicon-valley/
80
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it at the expense of other funders. See John C. Coffee, Jr. Toxic Unicorns,
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/11/06/toxic-unicorns-what-has-beenmissed-about-weworks-fiasco/, Nov. 6, 2019. Coffee observes that this dilution of others
was not clearly disclosed even in the public offering documents filed with the SEC.
81
On the conflicts and incentives associated with managed investment portfolios generally,
see James Spindler, How Private is Private Equity and at What Cost?, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 311
(2009); Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. Acct’g Res. 391 (2009); John
Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers, 123 Yale L.J. 1228 (2014); Anita Krug,
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fees, often combining on-going management fees and high-powered incentive
fees. The asset base on which the periodic fees are calculated is based on current
valuations—commonly, the price set at the latest round. In this sense, the VC
gets a tangible payoff from an inflated valuation even if, later on, the bubble
deflates. In a widely-noted article published recently, two financial economists
criticized the industry for basing reported valuations on the most recent round’s
price without adjustment for the special rights and privileges of pre-existing
classes—a practice that they say inflates later-round private share values by
nearly 50% compared to a more rigorous econometric method.82 In a recent
SEC advisory, the staff observed that failures to value private funds’ holdings in
accordance with the disclosed valuation process have led to overcharging
management fees and carried interest based on inappropriately overvalued
holdings.83
Just as concerning are the effects of bubbles on the attraction of investors
to new funds being sponsored by the VCs and later-round asset managers.
These portfolio managers should be somewhat disciplined by the fact that they
raise new rounds of capital as earlier portfolios age out—the failure to achieve
real returns, not just inflated valuations, should be noticed by savvy investors
looking for talented money managers. That discipline does exist for highly
reputable funds that cater to savvy investors.84 But not all sources of private
capital seem to figure that out, and so there are opportunities to new fundraising to high points in valuation, and of obscuring actual performance at the
end of a fund’s run so that comparative success or failure is hard to parse out by
any but the most astute.85 The emergence of mutual funds, with large numbers
Will Gornall & Ilya Strebulaev, Squaring Venture Capital Valuations with Reality, 135 J. Fin.
Econ. 120 (2020), discussed in Yves Smith, Fake Valuations are Running Roughshod Over the
Venture
Capital
Industry,
New
York
Magazine,
Nov.
14,
2018,
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/fake-unicorns-are-running-over-the-venturecapital-industry.html.
83
The SEC’s Office of Compliance, Inspections and Examinations recently issued a list of
the kinds of conflicts of interest it has observed, including valuation biases. Risk Alert:
Observations from Examinations of Investment Advisers Managing Private Funds, June 23, 2020, at
https://www.sec.gov/files/Private%20Fund%20Risk%20Alert_0.pdf.
84
See Gregory Brown et al., Do Private Equity Funds Manipulate Reported Returns?, 132 J. Fin.
Econ. 267 (2019) (demonstrating incentive of lower reputation funds to distort earnings,
but suggesting that on average they do not success due to investor sophistication).
85
On the incentives to obscure directed at those who invest in venture capital, see Indraneel
Chakraborty & Michael Ewens, Managing Performance Signals through Delay: Evidence from
Venture Capital, 64 Mgt. Sci. 2473 (2018); in private equity funds, see Brad Barber & Ayako
Yasuda, Interim Fund Performance and Fundraising in Private Equity, 124 J. Fin. Econ. 172
82

18

of retail investors, as major funders has underscored this particular problem
because they are constantly in search of new money.86
We have only scratched the surface here, hopefully enough to add to the
list of reasons why heavy monitoring might be in decline and the conventional
monitoring model of venture finance under stress. Presumably, sophisticated
upstream suppliers of capital will understand the conflicts, seek out the
intermediaries with good reputations, and insist on transparency and
protection. But less diligent investors will increasingly be subject to attraction
to segments of the private markets via sales savvy as much or more than
evidence of skill and loyalty,87 so that the conflicts of interest become all the
more pernicious.88 How this works out in contemporary venture financing is
still only dimly understood because of lack of transparency, but surely raises
doubts about the assumption that upstream investor diligence offers a
dependable check on founder overreaching as funders become more diverse in
interests and incentives, and compete with each other for the allotments they
lust over for more reasons than appear at first glance.

III.

WEWORK PART 2: CULTURE OF CONFLICTS

We now resume our case study of WeWork, where the
hypermotivation and agency costs associated with corporate adolescence
appeared to contribute to the culture of conflicts and the lack of internal
controls. From the self-interested transactions, to the taking of corporate
(2017); Ludovic Phalippou, Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. Econ. Perspectives
147 (2009).
86
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opportunities, to the personal loans and nepotism, the array of conflicts was
considerable and implicated not just Neumann and his family but members of
the board and the investment bankers.
Neumann embodied all of the adolescent characteristics described in
Part II. He was bold, young, and male, and he had conflicts of every sort. He
owned stakes in buildings leased to WeWork.89 He sold the trademark “We,”
to the company for $6 million dollars.90 He had voting control over the
company, and his wife had control over his replacement.91 He was allowed to
“sell and borrow more than $1 billion dollars against his WeWork stake.”92
The corporate adolescent culture also allowed for the masking of
conflicts as creativity. Consider WeGrow, the school the Neumanns built, with
WeWork money, to educate their own children. Whether through action or
inaction, the board acquiesced in WeGrow, a school that had nothing to do with
the business of the company – unless that nurturing the entrepreneurial spirit
of elementary school children connects to the core of an office leasing company.
Rebekah was the CEO and opened WeGrow at WeWork headquarters in the
fall of 2018. The for-profit school cost $42,000 per year and offered yoga,
mindfulness, Spanish, Mandarin, and Hebrew.93 Like all WeWork projects,
this one had its quirks, including that although parents were allowed into the
family waiting room, nannies were required to wait outside. Why? Apparently
because Rebekah Neumann did not want her nannies inside.94 In short, “‘The
whole thing was about her and what was right for her children,’ a person close
to the school said.”95 Indeed, when the Neumanns relocated to San Francisco
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in the winter of 2019, they took a teacher from WeGrow with them – a conflict
within a conflict.96
Neumann also borrowed from the company – repeatedly. At one point,
the total seemed to be over $740 million tied to his shares in the company.97
He also had a low-interest loan from the company for $380 million that allowed
him to exercise stock options early.98 If the company had been public, this loan
would have been illegal – as a result of the IPO issues and other excesses that
led to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002.99
In addition, the company employed lots of “Neumanns.” Rebekah was
CEO of WeGrow and the Chief Brand and Impact Officer at WeWork.100 Her
brother-in-law was the Chief Product Officer.101 Adam’s brother-in-law ran
the fitness part of the company.102 The company also regularly used contractors
and vendors owned by executives.103 And, the parents of the Vice-Chair of the
real estate division, were the real-estate brokers on a building lease in Miami.104
Indeed, “[a]t an executive retreat in Montauk on Long Island, Mr. Neumann
once raised a glass in a toast ‘to nepotism,’” further exhibiting the total lack of
controls or even appreciation for them.105 No doubt, the nepotism contributed
to the echo chamber of entitlement and confidence.
The board and investors also allowed Neumann to do something
generally frowned upon in startups – when new money came in, Neumann sold
his own stock and reaped profits.106 He also restructured the company’s voting
stock in order to continue to maintain control.107 Bruce Dunlevie, from
Benchmark, pushed back, arguing that “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”108
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Despite those concerns, the board voted unanimously to allow both the voting
stock change and the stock sales.
Neumann’s voting control, like that of Mark Zuckerberg, Travis
Kalanick, and others, meant that he had the power to oust dissenting voices on
the board. The early board had four people,109 but even as it grew with new
investors, rising to nine by the time of the S-1, the culture of conflicts and
Neumann’s voting power remained. The directors gave Neumann that power,
but risked losing their seats and a view of the company in which they were
invested – even though their legal role was as fiduciaries for the company and
the other shareholders.
The conflicts were not limited to Neumann. Indeed, the terms “related
parties” or “related party” appeared more than 100 times in the prospectus the
company filed.110 Consider the board member conflicts. WeWork employed
the son of John Zhao, from the investor Hony Capital.111 Dunlevie’s daughter
was also an employee.112 Lew Frankfort, the former CEO of Coach, Inc.,
“borrowed from WeWork to buy stock and exercise some stock options early
-- a move typically made to save on taxes.”113 Steve Langman’s private equity
group became a co-manager of the WeWork real-estate fund business and
earned management fees and profits on any properties purchased.114 Then,
when WeWork expanded its own involvement in the real-estate fund business,
and Rhone’s stake decreased, WeWork gave him restricted shares to make up
for the changed business model.115 In short, the culture bred conflicts at all
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levels, and because investors and board members alike were involved, no one
had an incentive to say no.
The money continued to flow and so did the acquisitions and business
decisions – arguably unrelated to the business of WeWork and certainly
unchecked by the board. The core business of WeWork was real estate, but it
bought an event planning business, a search engine optimization company, and
a coding school.116 Neumann made an offer for the salad company, Sweetgreen,
Inc., and as noted before, opened WeGrow.117 The directors apparently raised
concerns about the disparate choices, but the company kept spending on
unrelated companies – with tacit, if not explicit, board approval.
Also, without board intervention, Neumann lavished money on an
executive suite, building an exercise room and adding a sauna and ice bath to
his offices in New York and San Francisco. He used the company jet for
personal trips, when he decided to buy a top-of-the-line Gulfstream jet, the
directors acquiesced – even though investors, like T. Rowe Price complained
and told “management and the board that it had grown sour on the company.”118
T. Rowe Price then sold off as much stock as it could in the SoftBank
transactions.119
Throughout all of these transactions, the directors, who had a voice and
could have, for example, made noisy exits, continued to enable the scheme and
hope for an IPO. Why? Because they had money in the company, and they
believed the public markets would provide both an exit and a necessary check
on Neumann. As a result, Schwartz, Dunlevie, and Langman urged Neumann
to commit to an IPO, but Softbank and Neumann resisted – at least until
Softbank’s own investment value plunged.120
The banks also played a role. Just like at Enron, the bankers had been
developing relationships with Neumann, hoping for the IPO. They had earned
fees on the private offerings and were invested in the company, but now,
millions of dollars in IPO fees were around the corner, and Neumann’s selfprescribed “personal banker,”121 Jamie Dimon and Goldman Sachs were
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onboard. They provided no check or balance, drafting a prospectus that was
subject to derision for its wacky language and valuations that the market
immediately rejected as unsupported by a company that had turned a profit only
once – many years prior. Investors also revolted against the “string of
conflicts.”122
Indeed, according to the Financial Times, the investment banks vying for
the IPO pitched Neumann with valuation numbers based on nothing more than
“teenage exuberance.” Proposals ranged from $46 to $63 billion (JP Morgan),
$61 to $96 billion (Goldman Sachs), and $43 to $104 billion (Morgan
Stanley).123 Yet, when the public spoke, WeWork had to ratchet down its
expectations, pulling the offering when the valuation was trending toward $15
billion, or more than $30 billion below the valuation at the time of the last
Softbank infusion.
The underwriting arm of the banks, of course, had already earned
millions in fees and stood to gain much more on the public offering as well as
loans they planned to structure. JP Morgan had loaned Neumann, in his
personal capacity, hundreds of millions of dollars, including for the buildings
that he bought and then leased back to WeWork. Indeed, the role of the banks
in WeWork, its “growth”, and its IPO has been described as “enabling,” to be
distinguished from evaluating, checking, balancing, or even providing healthy
skepticism.124
As IPO hopes deflated, and in an attempt to stem controversy and
complaints, Neumann searched for more money and added a woman to the
board – without consulting the other directors. When they found out, they
“vented” about it at a board meeting, where typically, Neumann was not
present. Later, Neumann apologized and said he would change his ways.125
Nevertheless, he pushed back on the governance changes his bankers said were
necessary for the IPO – acceding when desperation prevailed. Neumann then
agreed to: the appointment of a lead independent director by the end of the
year, a 50 percent decrease in his voting rights, and the elimination of the
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provision allowing his wife to select his successor.126 It was, however, too little,
too late.
The interest in the offering was insufficient, and calls for Neumann to
step down grew. Even Mr. Son’s representative board members understood
that Neumann had to go. Indeed, investors and executives at companies backed
by Softbank urged Son to move against Neumann.127 Finally, Dimon told
Neumann he had to choose – IPO or CEO.128
For Neumann, the choice was clear. If he didn’t step down, the IPO
would not happen. There would be no cash, and his stake would be worthless.
At first, he agreed to relinquish his CEO title but not voting control, but to do
so, he demanded payment, and Softbank bought him out with a consulting fee
and stock purchases. Then, the board forgave $1.75 million in funds he owed
to WeWork for personal travel and other expenses.129 When the offering failed
outright, the board switched its focus to saving the company.
Ironically, reflecting on the process many months later, Goldman’s
CEO, David Solomon, indicated that the public process was key to the demise
of WeWork and that the private process was to blame. Speaking on a Unicorn
panel at Davos in January of 2020, Solomon stated, “One of the things that I’ve
said publicly... is the process actually worked around WeWork.”130 In an IPO,
the banks are faced with a private company with numbers that are not public
and must work with the company to see whether the model works – before
setting an actual public market value. According to Solomon, the vetting
occurs when, ultimately there’s a diligence process, there’s a proving out
process, there, at times, are meetings with investors beforehand, and that
process grounds to reality.”131 The WeWork process, he said, worked, even if
it “might not have been as pretty as everybody would like it to be.”132 As he
noted, part of the issue is that private companies are also “not held to the same
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standard around producing information” as their public counterparts,133
arguably causing distortions like those in Uber, Theranos and WeWork.
Importantly, missing from these statements is a recognition, let alone
ownership, of Goldman’s contribution to this “private” adolescence. Goldman
and the other banks provided funding to WeWork, series after series, along the
way, enabling every choice of Neumann. At each series, the banks had the
power to set the valuation and the opportunity to demand better information
from the company. Yet, only when faced with the public regime, their own
potential for strict liability, and the market rejection of an arguably ridiculous,
if not false, prospectus, that they were forced to recalibrate and withdraw the
offering.
IV.

PRIVATE PRIVILEGES, ENABLING BOARDS, AND FIDUCIARY DEFICITS

Start-up financing occurs under a set of exemptions, some longstanding, others more recent—that remove the disclosure obligations required
in public markets on the assumption that private ordering suffices.134 This
exemptive privilege, in turn, assumes that the parties to the sequential rounds
of financing will be faithful agents, i.e., fiduciaries, to their own sources of
capital. Where there are conflicts of interest, fiduciary deficits will arise unless
either the threat of litigation for breaches of duty sufficiently deters the
resulting opportunism or the sources of capital are themselves sufficiently
watchful and savvy to combat the opportunism. As sources of private capital
become more numerous and diverse, as suggested in Part II, the latter may not
happen so reliably.
By all accounts, WeWork’s extraordinary growth over eight rounds of
financing strengthened Neumann’s hand and concealed ample danger signs. In
the absence of required disclosure, fiduciary duties take on extra significance.
We understand that the board was limited in its power once Neumann took his
super-voting rights, and lost more maneuvering room when Softbank opened
its checkbook with what seemed to be blind faith in Neumann leadership.
There is still a cautionary story about governance failure. This Part thus turns
to the role of the WeWork board of directors in this story.
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A. The Culture of Conflicts and an Enabling Board
Consider the simple controls built into the fiduciary duties of directors
and officers and how they were designed to address these issues. Duties of
candor, obligations surrounding conflicts of interest and corporate
opportunities, and requirements for conscious choices (whether “good” or
“bad”) should mediate agency costs. Those duties are about loyalty, good faith,
and oversight, and all were at issue in the WeWork story, where the board
enabled conflicts, was controlled by Neumann, and neglected the investors and
stakeholder employees who funded it.
The boards are missing in the WeWork saga and those of its “peers.”
With each additional funding round, while WeWork’s paper valuation grew,
the mechanisms for control did not. When Masayoshi Son told Adam Neumann
to spend faster, Neumann did so, and the directors failed to ask questions and
question answers.135 The company grew, the nature of the investors changed,
but the leaders did not grow up. Instead, they went to summer camp and drank
tequila shots, seemingly stuck in adolescence, while the board watched but did
not engage.136 In doing so, the board abdicated its most important
responsibility: to make, not avoid, decisions, thus violating duties of care and
loyalty, including good faith. There are many complicated reasons for these
failures, which Elizabeth Pollman has detailed – contracts around or embedding
conflicts, investor outs, and ratchets to name a few.137 Her premise, with which
we do not quibble, is that startup governance problematizes corporate
governance norms.138 It does not, however, eliminate the duties – just the
internal controls those duties impose and create.
In short, good faith and the disclosure discourse inherent in it is designed
to play a role in establishing internal controls – even in startups and
problematically, with longer term corporate adolescents. Recall Mark
Schwartz’s statements at WeWork’s board meeting on October 3, 2019,
Brooker, supra note 35.
Eliot Brown, How Adam Neumann’s Over-the-Top Style Built WeWork. ‘This Is Not the Way
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noting that he had “stayed silent too long.” And that he would tolerate “[n]o
more fantasies.”139 According to the Wall Street Journal, Schwartz and his fellow
directors had “stayed silent so long that the story was almost over.”140 In doing
so, the directors enjoyed the privilege of private status, doomed the company’s
IPO, and failed to adhere to their fiduciary duties.
Neumann, who was no longer CEO, was present at that board meeting;
yet, when CEO, he rarely attended board meetings -- presumably, because he
controlled the decisions anyway. Yet, allowing him to skip meetings was a
failure on the board’s part. So, why was he there this time? Because WeWork
was “perilously low on cash after years of freewheeling spending” and was the
“butt of jokes on Wall Street.”141 Despite receiving almost $40 billion in cash
over the years, arguably a powerful misallocation of capital, at the date of the
board meeting, the hoped for IPO had crashed and burned, and the company
had only a few weeks of funds left.
To be sure, the directors repeated silence was a governance failure.
Indeed, the failure of the people and entities on which the privilege of private
ordering was bestowed and the resulting failure of culture was enabled by board
members and investment bankers, all of whom failed to engage.142 This board,
like those of other corporate adolescents, was comprised of investor
representatives with negotiated roles. From Softbank, which, through
Masayoshi Son, urged Neumann to spend with abandon, to the venture
capitalists who did not raise or push issues, the board members failed to fulfill
their fiduciary duties. The gatekeeper bankers, of course, were not on the
board, and they funded the choices, supporting Neumann, championing the
company, and hoping for the chance to do the IPO – at least until publicness
intervened.143 And, everyone joined in the adolescent culture, enabling the
culture of conflicts to grow unchecked.144
Consider the conflicts and related party transactions listed in the
prospectus and detailed in Part III. The WeWork offering documents stated
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that all were approved by the board, but after reading about how the board
operated and its culture of silence, one wonders what really happened with each
conflict. Indeed, the fact that many of the directors had conflicts of their own
presumably embedded a you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours culture that
lowered the threshold for discourse and candor and enabled Neumann’s
ongoing conflicts. Who wants to engage in deep scrutiny of another’s conflict
when it might result in greater scrutiny of your own? Moreover, as Part II
revealed, the motivations of the board members are at best mixed even before
the culture of conflicts becomes embedded. Here, the result was the failure to
examine and recognize privilege, the failure to understand the choices, and the
failure of the IPO.145
Notably, without affirmative approval by disinterested directors or
shareholders, corporate law once would have declared many of the WeWork
conflicts void and now views them as voidable. Yet, there are no “disinterested”
or independent directors in today’s startups.146 Even if they are not implicated
in the Neumann-specific transactions and thus conflicted in the traditional
sense, the behavior of the WeWork directors reveals that they viewed their role
as enablers of the choices and were unwilling or incapable of playing the role
corporate law prescribes. Indeed, conflicted themselves, they did not question
the choices or give voice to concerns; instead, enjoying the privileges of the
private offering regime and engaging in the very fiduciary deficits corporate law
is designed to prevent.
B. The Nature of Candor, Discourse, and Good Faith
Traditionally, the role of venture capitalists on startup boards was
perceived as providing a strong guiding hand to get the company to maturity.147
See also Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures, 107 Geo. L. Rev 967
(2018)(analyzing how transparency and disclosure decrease in the face of when companies
experience downturns).
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Yet, the dialogue and engagement necessary to effect that was missing at
WeWork. Also seemingly missing were conversations about conflicts and
whether they should be avoided, or the question-asking, dialogue-building role
that would allow the directors to vet risks and challenge management’s
understanding of its own role, choices, and privileged status.
Indeed, the power of good faith discourse is that it has the power to alter
choices – and that is its purpose.148 It can reaffirm initial choices, and that is also
its purpose. Both outcomes are examples of the power of the informationforcing-substance theory in action. Both are also examples of active and engaged
decision making149 – the opposite of staying silent and feeding fantasies. And,
they are examples of good faith in application and the creative friction that
boards are supposed to provide and is their value. The goal is the conversation,
the dialogue, the discourse, and the substance it produces.
Corporate directors, even those adhering to the proverbial nose-infingers-out line, are required to engage in monitoring and oversight.150 This
fiduciary duty is at the core of the good-faith obligation rooted in the duty of
loyalty. Staying silent was not Mark Schwartz’s role – nor was it the role of any
of the other directors. In doing so, they presumably failed to make conscious
choices – a precondition for the application of the business judgment rule.151
They also presumably violated their duty of care and arguably failed to act in
the face of problematic information, a hallmark of bad faith, which when
sustained violates good faith.152
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Of course, corporate law has the ability to sanction bad faith via
derivative litigation, and deception via the duty of candor. But these are
notoriously difficult to prove. Delaware courts have carved out room for a
disloyalty claim for exit transactions that favor preferred stockholders (i.e.,
funders) over founders and employees who hold options, signaling that
directors cannot simply claim loyalty to those shareholders responsible for their
appointment to the board. But this “Trados” line of cases has been heavily
criticized by academics as inefficient and unrealistic,153 and in any event has not
been extended to oversight or monitoring. The natural human inclination to
represent one’s principal is hard to overcome. Independent directors have
persuasively been characterized as there mainly to play a mediator role, limiting
their involvement unless needed to referee a dispute between founders and
funders. This enables avoidance when the primary constituents are at peace,
which is likely when the start-up has momentum.
There are also practical reasons to doubt that litigation will produce an
optimal level of attentiveness, whether state or (as to fraud) federal.154 There
are many reasons for this result, including, for example, the ratchet provision
protecting Mayoshi, and as Elizabeth Pollman points out, the contracts and
other provisions investors build in to protect themselves. Further, in the case
of WeWork, we know that T. Rowe Price, a key institutional investor,
recouped its earlier stage investment in a later round while making clear that it
was disgusted by the company’s antics. That ability to recoup, however, also
decreases the likelihood of litigation. Conflicts of interest may arise as well –
portfolio managers may hesitate to sue well-established VC’s and other early
investors because the result might be exclusion from future opportunities.
See Pollman, supra note 4; Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Don’t Go Chasing Waterfalls: Fiduciary
Duties in Venture Capital-backed Startups, Oct. 31, 2020, available at
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The challenge in WeWork and other unicorn adolescents is that the
privilege of private status was not designed for companies that stay “private” for
as long as or of the size of WeWork. It was designed with the idea that
sophisticated investors, including venture capitalists and banks, would invest in
the companies, perform gatekeeping functions, nurture the companies, and
allow the public regime, including its powerful litigation remedies, to take
over.155
This, then, is where the system failed. The private offering regime has
layered on privileges for adolescents incapable of managing the business,
particularly long term, let alone navigating lines related to legality. The
mythology has fueled spectacular growth and equally spectacular failures,
making money for venture capitalists, banks, and money managers, but without
asking the corporate adolescents or their funders to adult up. The result is the
misallocation of capital, risky choices, and spillovers to downstream investors
and stakeholders.156
In the end, WeWork failed to sustain it massive valuation in ways that
seem to have confounded regulators, policy makers and the academics. The
companies evolved, but private governance aspirations failed to do so. The
system simply is not designed for long-term “startup” governance, and
WeWork reveals the systemic slack and flaws. The “fix” requires some of the
myth busting we have attempted in this article and understanding that the
system is not nearly perfect. The reliance on reputational capital, if appropriate
a decade ago, is no longer so.157 Indeed, assuming that conflicts and fiduciary
deficits are unsolvable or always beneficial produces WeWorks. When the
adults in the room are not accountable for the adolescents, candor, discourse,
and good faith don’t stand a chance: there is no internal control system to
Compare Fried & Ganor, supra note 147 (stating “[s]tartup boards – unlike public company
boards – are also frequently and intimately involved in strategic decision making and
personnel issues.”) with Lerner & Nanda, supra note 3, at 252 (emphasizing the rise of
founder friendly behavior and the pressure for VCs not to be overbearing). See also Ewens
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2002 to 25% for startups originated in 2013).
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prevent fiduciary deficits. When fiduciary obligations fail to grow with the
funding rounds, the need for an increased focus on risk and its consequences is
ignored.158 Yet, as a company’s reach grows, the range of harm also expands,
allowing failures that impact many more people and stakeholders than simply
the venture capitalists and investment banks.159
V.

CONCLUSION

Drawing from the WeWork saga and academic research about changing
motivations, incentives and opportunities in start-up financing, we see an
accumulating set of deficits that makes the current state of affairs more
problematic than the conventional account would suggest:
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Founder control is more likely, enabling more sustained selfcentered and biased behaviors that, even if adaptive to an extent,
produce risky behaviors among those not able to handle the
glorification or freedom.
The market for funding is more crowded, with private equity and
venture finance being offered by a wider range of funders who
have diverse incentives driven by the opportunities for fees and
new funding opportunities before earlier investments pan out or
not. As such, agency cost issues are present not simply at the
level of the start-up, but upstream to the relationship between
funders and their own (increasingly diverse and not always
sophisticated) sources of capital.
Start-up valuations are set in a market lacking many of the
mechanisms of efficiency and subject to a winner’s curse, which
plays into these upstream and downstream incentives and biases.
As a result of all the foregoing, fiduciary and information-forcing
norms weaken.
Directors focus on constituent protection or conflict mediation
in exercising whatever power they possess, rather than attending
in good faith to their duties of candor, care and loyalty.

Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness” supra note 4 (describing the need for two distinct
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(5)

These deficits combine with the fast-growing flow of money into
start-up financing to enable a longer period of undisciplined
corporate adolescence during which the misbehavior risk rises,
threatening investors and others

That is as far as we will go here. What to do about all of this is a hard
question; we recognize, for example, that expansive disclosure requirements
are not necessarily well suited for start-ups pursuing innovative strategies.
However, we are convinced that the more dark space we afford start-ups and
funders in the name of innovation, the more important it is for there to be good
governance to oversee how that freedom is being used and to lessen the
fiduciary deficits exhibited in the WeWork story and elsewhere. Maybe the
better policy is to nudge start-ups toward a quicker IPO, with at least some of
the rites of passage.160 At least then disclosure and publicness have the potential
to shed light on the private choices of funders and founders.161
We are more confident as to what not to do, but is happening rapidly.
For much of its history, as noted earlier, securities regulation sought to limit
access to the private markets to qualified investors presumed able to fend for

Other regulatory reforms associated with the JOBS Act simplified the IPO process for
emerging growth companies, which produced a step-up in biotech capital formation and
accompanying innovation. See Craig Lewis & Joshua White, Deregulating Innovation Capital:
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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3640852. But see Coffee, supra
note 80.
161
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of their ideas. See, e.g., Elizabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the
Decline of the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445 (2017); Langevoort & Thompson,
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themselves, a category that has expanded slowly but surely in recent decades.162
In the JOBS Act of 2012, Congress gave a boost to the effort by making it easier
to prospect for such accredited investors. While this was often portrayed in
terms of allowing start-ups to find a greater number of investors, the main
effect was to give investment intermediaries (e.g., hedge funds) greater ability
to attract capital to invest under its portfolio management, exacerbating the
upstream agency cost problem and diminishing the ability of conventional VCs
to dampen adolescent impulses.
This effort accelerated considerably in 2019, when the SEC announced
its intention to enlarge the size of the retail investor population entitled to cross
the wall and participate in private investment.163 The category of accredited
investors was soon enlarged, and more reforms adopted in late fall 2020. The
Commission doubled down on the strategy by proposing exemptive212 relief
from broker-dealer status to those who hustle to find accredited investors for
private offerings.164 The Department of Labor joined the deregulation party
with its own ERISA-based directive to allow retirement savings of accredited
investors to move more heavily in alternative private investments. The “equity”
claim that they deserve comparable investment opportunities to those now
limited to the relatively privileged few comes through loud and clear. There is
no reason, however, to believe that retail investors newly introduced into this
space will find comparable opportunities to those afforded truly sophisticated,
experienced players who can lean in against agency costs in how their money is
invested. Rather, these new investors will find their way to market segments
where salesmanship and marketing savvy abound and then overpay in search of
already picked-over chances. How well upstream investors fend for themselves
remains to be seen: we know much too little. Yet the regulatory movement is
See Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness” supra note 4. Once based on subjective factors
like genuine sophistication and ready access to information, the scope of the exemptive
philosophy has become more objective over time: today, financial status (more than $1
million in assets, or more than $200,000 in annual income, with a variety of adjustments)
sets the basic threshold, with a higher level of wealth ($5 million in investible assets) needed
to invest in high performance fee-paying entities in the private capital markets, like hedge
funds. Less well-off investors, as we have seen, can enter the private investment realm, but
for the most part, only through a willingness to invest through more heavily regulated mutual
funds and similar vehicles.)
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to open the private markets to more retail investors, ignoring the costs of the
fiduciary deficits and, instead, relying on the myth of corporate adolescence,
the infatuation with innovation, and the winning lottery tickets for those who
get in the game early enough.
Why the politics of entrepreneurial capital-raising are tilting this way is
a complicated question. No doubt much of what is pushing this is pure special
interest muscle, which is a good reason by itself for legal academics to take
more of an interest in the subject. The inspiring narratives about start-ups as
drivers of innovation and job creation, geniuses who promise to invent us a
better future, and the potential “equal playing field” created by allowing more
retail investors into a space heretofore reserved for the already over-privileged
all enable corporate adolescence.
Our cautionary note here, then, is not that innovation is an unworthy
goal compared to investor protection, but simply that the assessment should be
a sober one. High-tech innovation, after all, has decidedly mixed effects on
employment, destroying jobs at incumbent firms without necessarily creating a
comparable number of new ones. Some researchers believe that we are facing
a time of harder-to-find good technological ideas,165 meaning that the money
chasing the best ideas will face greater risk of disappointment on average and a
winner’s curse as to financing the occasional breakthroughs. Meanwhile, the
fees keep coming to the money managers. There is reason to question the
assumption that the system of entrepreneurial finance we’ve chosen is
necessarily the best—or fairest—at allocating capital to the most socially
productive ideas.166 Thus, the payoff from telling stories like WeWork, and of
coming to better understand ever-changing incentives for rent-seeking inside
that system, is that we expose the adolescent culture of conflicts and fiduciary
deficits and put away the rose-colored glasses when deciding what is best going
forward.
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